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THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006:
AN OVERVIEW OF SWEEPING CHANGES
IN THE LAW GOVERNING
RETIREMENT PLANS
CRAIG C. MARTIN* & JOSHUA RAFSKY*"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Issues surrounding the future of pensions are of paramount
importance as the oldest baby boomers approach retirement.
Congress recently enacted the comprehensive and cumbersome
Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA") to combat the impairment
of several major defined benefit plans. One of the PPA's main
purposes is to eliminate defined benefit plan underfunding by
revamping the old rules governing defined benefit funding. Other
major, and intended consequences of the PPA, however, are the
encouragement and promotion of the use of defined contribution
plans, as well as the legitimization of controversial cash balance
plans.
This article provides an overview of some of the major
provisions of the PPA. It also explores possible policy implications
on the future of the defined benefit plan and considers the future
of employer sponsored retirement plans. Part II of this article
defines and provides key demographics about baby boomers. Part
III describes and discusses the two major types of pension plans:
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. Part IV
overviews the decline of the defined benefit plan as the favored
Part V highlights the
employer sponsored retirement plan.
Part VI
current troubles facing the defined benefit system.
discusses the importance of a properly functioning retirement
system. Part VII provides an overview of the newly enacted PPA
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by discussing both the genesis of the PPA and some of its key
provisions. Finally, Part VIII considers the future of employer
sponsored retirement plans.

II. "BABY BOOMERS," DEFINED
The end of World War II brought about a surge of elation and
pride as American soldiers returned home victorious. World War
II changed the economic fate of the United States by spurring
manufacturing and inevitably bringing the country out of the
Great Depression. As the soldiers returned home, childbirth rates
increased dramatically. The result was a population explosion.
Consequently, the term "baby boomers" commonly refers to the
segment of our population that is the result of that explosion those born after World War II from 1946 to 1964.1
According to 2000 United States Census figures, the "baby
boom" fueled the largest population percentage increase of any age
group in the last decade. 2 The eldest segment of baby boomers
generated a fifty-five percent increase in the 50 to 54 year-old age
demographic.' The number of 45 to 49 year-olds increased by
forty-five percent.4 At the time of the 2000 Census, those born at
the end of the baby boom (the 35 to 39 year-olds) comprised the
largest five- year age group.' The second largest five-year age
group was the 40 to 44 year-old age group.6 In total, this ten-year
age span of baby boomers comprises over sixteen percent of the
population of the United States.7
As a group, baby boomers "have enjoyed higher income during
their working years than any preceding generation, and they have
been accumulating substantial savings, in part to provide for their
retirement."' Baby boomers will benefit from higher retirement
income than previous generations;9 however, the retirement of
such a large segment of the population challenges the ability of

1. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce News,
Baby Boom Brought Biggest Increases Among People 45-to-54 Years Old

(2001), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/cbOlcnl84.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE RETIREMENT PROSPECTS OF THE BABY
BOOMERS 1 (2004).
9. Id. Although the baby boomer generation is predicted to fare well as a

whole during the retirement years, it is estimated that approximately twentyfive percent of baby boomer households are failing to accumulate sufficient
retirement savings. Id. Government assistance and benefit programs are
likely to be the only source of retirement income for this segment of the baby
boomer population. Id.
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government assistance and benefit programs to provide sufficient
resources to our aging workforce. More specifically, a large influx
of retirees threatens to overwhelm the already struggling Social
Security and Medicare programs."° Private retirement plans have
therefore become a powerful tool in retirement planning.
III. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS AND
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, DEFINED
Pension plans are retirement savings programs provided by
employers to employees." The two main categories of pension
plans are defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans." A
defined benefit plan is an employer-sponsored pension where the
employer has an obligation to contribute to the plan on behalf of
the employee. Such plans calculate employer contributions based
on the employee's salary and length of service." The traditional
defined benefit plan promises participants retirement benefits to
be paid periodically for the duration of the retiree's life. 4 Assets
are accumulated through employer contributions and profit from
investment of the plan's assets. 5 Defined benefit plans promise
fixed periodic benefits to employees, so the obligation to fund the
program rests with the employer. 6 Generally, the employer is
Individual
obligated to compensate for underfunding. 7

10. See id. ("[T]he population of retirees will grow much more quickly than
the taxpaying workforce, at a time when average benefits per retiree are
expected to continue rising. Those developments will place severe and
mounting budgetary pressures on the federal government."); see also U.S.
LABOR
IN
AMERICA:
THE
WORKER'S
ROLE,
DEP'T
OF
STATE,
("[With the post-war
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/oecon/chap9.htm.
baby-boom generation due to retire early in the 21st century, politicians grew
concerned in the 1990s that the government would not be able to pay all of its
Social Security obligations without either reducing benefits or raising payroll
taxes.").
11. Craig C. Martin, Matthew J. Renaud & Omar R. Akbar, What's Up On
Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 610 (2006).
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm,
114 YALE L.J. 451, 455-56 (2004).
14. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (quoting
Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)); Zelinsky,
supra note 13, at 456.
15. Martin et al., supra note 11, at 610-11. In some cases, employees also
contribute to the defined benefit plan. Id. at 611. However, the recipients of
the pension fund generally have "no right to the assets of the plan." Bash v.
Firstmark Standard Life Ins., Co., 861 F.2d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1988). Instead,
"[t]he essence of a defined-benefits plan is that the participants' pension
benefits are a specified amount, rather than a proportional share of the
pension fund's assets, as in a defined-contributions plan." Id.
16. Martin et al., supra note 11, at 610-11.
17. Id. at 611 & n.27 (citing Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
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participants are not provided with their own separate accounts,
nor do they have control over how the assets of the plan are
invested. 8
For some people, the defined benefit plan is the
The model
representative model of the "American Dream."
represents an American workplace based on manufacturing and
exporting and a workforce that remained loyal to its employers.
Historically, employees did not conceive of working for several
different companies throughout their careers. In other words,
employees worked hard and devoted the bulk of their careers to
one employer that provided a defined benefit plan and, in turn,
received hefty pensions to cover retirement expenses.
In contrast, defined contribution programs are compatible
with a younger, more mobile workforce. Defined contribution
plans are portable because they can be "rolled-over" to another
plan when a participant switches jobs. Furthermore, defined
contribution plans allow for more uniform investment growth
because salary and longevity do not dictate contributions; rather,
contributions are based on whatever portion of the participant's
salary the participant wants to contribute (up to the statutorily
allowed maximum) coupled with the employer's matching
contribution (provided to all participants).
Individual accounts are established for each participant in a
defined contribution plan. 9
Defined contribution programs
generally pay out in lump sums, and employees have control over
funding and investing in their own individual accounts. ° While
employers usually contribute to each defined contribution account
at specified rates, employers do not guarantee accounts.2 Risk of
decline in account assets is therefore borne by each individual
employee based on the investment choices he or she makes.
Defined contribution plans can never suffer from underfunding
because "each beneficiary is [only] entitled to whatever assets are
dedicated to his individual account. " 3
IV. THE DECLINE OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN

It is no secret that health care and retirement costs make up
a substantial portion of company overhead, especially in older

1105, 1113 (1988)); Hughes, 525 U.S. at 439; Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 456.
18. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 456.
19. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 439; Martin et al., supra note 11, at 611. This is in
contrast to defined benefit plans which are "funded collectively" in that
participants receive their benefits from contributions made by the employer to
a pooled common trust fund. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 456.
20. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 456-57.
21. Martin et al., supra note 11, at 611.
22. Id.
23. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 439.
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industries like manufacturing. 24 The impending retirement of the
baby boomer generation has prompted employers to investigate
cost efficient alternatives to expensive defined benefit pensions
because "legacy costs" place a major strain on the competitiveness
of a company. 5 Since 1985, there has been a sharp decline in the
number of private defined plans, but a significant increase in the
number of defined contribution programs.26
Several factors have contributed to the decline of the defined
benefit program in favor of the defined contribution program.
First, defined benefit plans are more costly to maintain than
defined contribution plans.27 Those costs are associated with the
myriad of complicated provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 28 which has been a factor in the
decline of defined benefit plans.2 9 ERISA places heavy regulatory
burdens on defined benefit plans, such as complex minimum
funding requirements, high premium payments to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), ° and high administrative
fees."2

24. See, e.g., JOSH BIVENS, ROBERT SCOTT & CHRISTIAN WELLEN, MENDING
MANUFACTURING: REVERSING POOR POLICY DECISION IS THE ONLY WAY TO
END CURRENT CRISIS 1 (2003), available at http://epinet.org/briefingpapers/
144/bp144.pdf.
25. Id.; Angela Boothe Noel, The Future of Cash Balance Plans: Inherently
Illegal or a Viable PensionOption?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 899, 900 (2005).
26. Craig C. Martin & Amanda S. Amert, Cash Balance PlansReassessed in
Light of Discriminationand Funding Litigation, 59 BuS. LAW 453, 454 (2004).
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation estimates that the number of
defined benefit plans has decreased from 114,000 to 40,000. Id. In contrast,
the United States Department of State estimates that the number of defined
contribution plans has increased from 461,000 to 647,000 since 1965. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 10; see also Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 470 ("[Tlhe
defined benefit system today stagnates; both the number of such plans and the
number of participants in them have declined.").
27. Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives
and other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 477 (2004).
28. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
29. Martin & Amert, supra note 26, at 454; Noel, supra note 25, at 901.
30. The PBGC is the federal agency established by ERISA, which is
charged with insuring pensions. PENSION BENEFIT GuAR. CORP., ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
(2005),
available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2005par.pdf.
Currently, the PBGC insures over
30,000 private defined benefit pension plans covering over forty-four million
workers and retirees. Id. However, in the event that a pension defaults, the
PBGC does not guarantee complete coverage of the amount of the affected
participants' pensions. The current cap on benefits that the PBGC will pay is
approximately $46,000 annually per participant at age sixty-five. Charles J.
Ford, Mark M. Glickman & Charles A. Jeszeck, Weaknesses in Defined Benefit
FundingRules: A Look at the Largest Plans, 1995-2002, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 351,
357 (2006).
31. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 455-56.

The John Marshall Law Review

[40:843

Second, employers are increasingly interested in eliminating
In
the investment risks associated with retirement plans.'
contrast to defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans
provide an effective means of shifting investment risk to
employees.3
Furthermore, the changing nature of the workforce has
contributed to the decline. Because defined benefit plans are
"back-loaded," the majority of the benefits earned by employees
accrue in the years approaching retirement.34 This back-loading
feature matched "the working trends of the 1950s and 1960s, when
workers typically spent most of their careers at a single
company. "' In effect, defined benefit plans reward longevity and
However, the American workforce has
discourage mobility."
become increasingly mobile, and younger employees are attracted
to the portability of defined contribution plans.37 Similarly, the
changing workplace, as demonstrated by the decline of the number
of large unionized companies and traditional industries sponsoring
defined benefit plans, has contributed to the erosion of the
popularity of defined benefit plans.38
Another factor leading to the decline is increased
international and domestic competition in older, traditional
industries. Manufacturing and exporting have been a backbone of
the United States economy. Older mainstays in these industries
struck deals With labor unions to provide generous pension and
health benefits for employees and retirees. Although our economy
is shifting away from industry to services, these older companies
are still subject to high employee and legacy costs. These costs are
In
deeply entrenched in these companies' cost structures.
contrast, newer domestic manufacturers and international
competitors do not face these same cost structures. Pension
funding at these older companies has contributed to the disparate
cost structures between traditional American companies and

32. Noel, supra note 25, at 902.
33. Id.
34. Martin & Amert, supra note 26, at 454.
35. Id.
36. Unlike 401(k) plans which employees can generally "roll-over" to
another plan after they switch jobs, defined benefit plans are not portable.
Monahan, supra note 27, at 477. "A worker who changes jobs cannot take his
defined benefit plan benefit with him." Id.
37. Noel, supra note 25, at 902.
38. Edward A. Zelinsky, DeregulatingMarriage:The Pro-MarriageCase for
Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1161, 1171 n.35 (2006); Noel,
supra note 25, at 902; see also Monahan, supra note 27, at 477 ("The
demographic shift in the United States away from manufacturing and other
traditionally union jobs, which are strongly associated with defined benefit
plan coverage, also contributed to the shift [from defined benefit to defined

contribution plans].").
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newer domestic and international companies, particularly when
those newer and foreign companies employ non-unionized labor.
This has forced companies to take cost-cutting measures,
since pension expenses impose a major strain on corporate
competitiveness.39 Indeed, many believe that traditional pension
plans and other legacy costs are major factors in the decline of the
international and domestic competitive position of old-line
manufacturing companies."
Transitioning away from defined
benefit plans may provide a much needed hedge for these
companies and enable them to secure their powerful positions in
the global economy.
Consequently, major corporations, even those that are
profitable, are freezing their pension programs and moving toward
employer sponsored, defined contribution plans.4 For instance,
IBM announced in January 2006 that it plans to freeze its pension
plan in the United States in 2008."2 This "effective deactivation of
one [of] the nation's biggest pension plans marks a significant
milestone in the gradual but persistent shift away from
traditional, defined-benefit plans at major U.S. corporations."43
Other high profile companies that have frozen or reduced future
defined benefit accruals in their defined benefit plans include
Verizon, Lockheed Martin, Alcoa, Sears, Hewlett Packard and
Motorola." Employers are finding that traditional defined benefit
plans are too costly and place them at a competitive disadvantage
against peers who offer less costly 401(k) and other defined
contribution programs, and that defined contribution plans
39. See John Burritt McArthur, Private Pensions and the Justificationfor
Social Security, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2006) ("With international
competition increasing pressure on old-line companies, many have forced
employees to replace defined-benefit pensions with defined-contribution plans,
in which the payout varies depending upon how well the invested funds
fare."); see also MARK M. GLICKMAN & CHARLES A. JESZECK, U.S.
GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PBGC AND THE CURRENT
CHALLENGES FACING THE U.S. DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION SYSTEM 3 (2005),

available at http://www.socrates.berkeley.edu/-iir/fevents/springO5/seminars/
glickman/glickman.pdf ("Since PBGC's insured plans lie disproportionately in
industries that are facing intense global competition (or have already been
decimated, as in the case of steel), PBGC's balance sheet is likely to worsen
drastically in the near term.").
40. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
41. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Marilyn Adams & Kathy Chu, Even Health
Firms Freeze or Cut Loose TraditionalPensions, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 7, 2005,
at lB.
42. Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron
World, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 569 (2006); Ellen E. Schultz et al., IBM to
Freeze Pension Program in '08, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://www.online.
wsj.com/article/SB113649758562938958.html?mod=home-whatsnews us.
43. Schultz et al., supra note 42.
44. See 152 CONG. REC. S38 (2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/record.xpd?id=109-h20060308-38&person=400267.
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provide more stability and predictability than defined benefit
plans.45
V.

DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN TROUBLES

While the number of defined benefit plans has declined over
the past several years, many plans are still in existence. Millions
of employees and retirees are dependent on these plans. There is
currently about 1.6 trillion dollars in assets accumulated in
private-sector defined benefit plans.46
These plans cover
approximately one-fifth of all full-time private-sector employees. 4'
Nearly seventy-five percent of S&P 500 companies sponsor defined
benefit plans."
Recent studies have highlighted the funding problems
surrounding defined benefit plans.
The United States
Government Accountability Office ("GAO") recently reported that
between 1995 and 2002, thirty-nine percent of the 100 largest
defined benefit plans were less than fully funded.4 9 By 2002, over
half of the 100 largest defined benefit plans were underfunded,
with one quarter of the largest plans being less than ninety
percent funded. Moreover, on average 62.5 percent of the largest
plan sponsors per year made no cash contributions to their plans.5"
Consequently, an extremely troubling concern faced by the
baby boomer generation is the well-documented problems of the
defined pension programs of several major corporations, including
Delta Air Lines, US Airways, United Airlines, Polaroid, Kaiser
Aluminum, Bethlehem Steel, and others.5 These failures have
been attributed to the popping of the 2000 stock market bubble,
which reduced the asset values of many defined benefit plans, and
historically low interest rates, which caused an increase in plan
liabilities. 2 Moreover, competition in industries, such as airline,
steel, and automotive, which have traditionally provided defined

45. See Schultz et al., supra note 42 ("IBM has complained that its pension
program, which offers workers benefits based on the number of years they
work, is expensive and puts it at a disadvantage to its tech competitors"); see
also Armour et al., supra note 41 ("Companies are freezing or ending [defined
benefit] plans in part because pensions have become more costly, and the costs
are also less predictable amid lowered investment returns from the stock
market.").
46. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 469.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 469-70.
49. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: RECENT
EXPERIENCE OF LARGE DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN
FUNDING RULES (2005), available at httpJ/www.gao.gov/new.items/d05294.
pdf.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 41; Ford et al., supra note 30, at 351.
52. GLICKMAN & JESZECK, supra note 39, at 2.
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benefit plans, has led to the bankruptcies of companies with
severely underfunded plans.53
Instability in the defined benefit world has taken a major toll
on the PBGC, which reported a deficit of over 18.1 billion dollars
in 2006."4 The PBGC estimates that by the end of 2005
underfunding in pension plans "topped more than half a trillion
dollars," and the PBGC's potential exposure from financially
troubled plan sponsors reached 108 billion dollars. 5 Highlighting
this troubling trend is the collapse of United Airlines' pension
program, the largest corporate pension default in United States'
history. 6 When United Airlines turned its pension over to the
PBGC, the plan was more than ten billion dollars underfunded.57
The workers and retirees affected by the default were forced to
forfeit more than three billion dollars in pension benefits.58
VI. WHY A PROPERLY FUNCTIONING RETIREMENT
SYSTEM IS IMPORTANT

There are many reasons why a properly functioning
retirement system is important in the United States. Moral and
ethical concerns dictate in favor of a robust system. Indeed, the
defining characteristic of a civilized society is the showing of
benevolence toward its most vulnerable members - the youth, the
elderly, and the poor. 59 A retirement system is integral to ensuring
sufficient support for the nation's elderly.
The retirement system is also of critical fiscal importance to
the United States' economy. 5 In 2005, the Department of Labor
estimated the total value of United States pension assets,
including both public sector and private sector plans, at twelve

53. Id.
54. PENSION BENEFIT GuAR. CORP., 2006 ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT
16 (2006), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/PBGCAMR.pdf.
The staggering deficit stands in stark contrast to the $9.7 billion surplus the
PBGC reported at the end of fiscal year 2000. Ford et al., supra note 30, at
351. Compounding the concern over the PBGC's budget deficit is the fact that
PBGC's insurance payments are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
federal government. GLICKMAN & JESZECK, supra note 39, at 1.
55. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2005),
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/05annrpt.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Peter Tompkins, Essay: Immigration: Governments and
Lawyers on a Collision Course, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 891, 895
(1995) ("The measure of a civilized society must be the way it treats the
vulnerable and the marginalized .... ").
60. Aaron Klein, Divorce, Death, and Posthumous Qdros: When Is It Too
Late for a Divorcee to Claim Pension Benefits Under ERISA, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1651, 1658 (2005).
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trillion.6' Private employer pension plans hold around 4.3 trillion
dollars of those assets, including both deferred benefit and
deferred contribution plans.62 The staggering influx of capital into
the system makes it among the largest (if not the largest) segment
of the economy. Properly safeguarding and investing this capital
is crucial to our economic stability.
Moreover, retirement spending is economicaly significant
since "retirees spend lots of money and pay lots of taxes." Indeed,
some argue that regions with larger elderly populations fare better
economically because of the high spending rate among retirees.'
Because spending by retirees can have such a beneficial effect on
the economy, it is important to preserve retirees' income streams
by providing a properly functioning and stable retirement system.
VII. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT

A. Genesis of the Pension ProtectionAct of 2006
On the wake of many high-profile pension defaults and
corporate scandals, increasing public pressure to fix the "pension
crisis" forced politicians to take action. In 2005, the government
began making proposals to "strengthen the retirement security of
34 million workers."65
Three main objectives emerged: (1)
reforming defined benefit funding rules to ensure full funding; (2)
reforming PBGC premium rules to better reflect risks and costs;
and (3) increasing accountability and transparency through new
disclosure rules.66
In 2006, the PPA went into effect. 7 The PPA amends several
portions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")6 in
order to strengthen the defined benefit system as baby boomers
head toward retirement. 69 However, as will be discussed later, the
61. Elaine L. Chao, U.S. Sec'y of Labor, Protecting the Retirement Security
of America's Workers: The President's Plan for Reforming Private Defined
Benefit Pension Plans (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/speeches
/20050110 retirement.htm.
62. Id.
63. Patrick Barta, Aging in Place Keeps Homes Off the Market, REAL
ESTATE JOURNAL.COM, http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/relocation/
20010503-barta.html.
64. Id.
65. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bush Administration Proposal to
Strengthen the Retirement Security of 34 Million Workers Announced by
Secretary of Labor (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http-//www.dol.gov/opa/media/
press/opa/opa20050041.htm.
66. Id.
67. News Release, George W. Bush, Pres., White House, President Bush
Signs H.R. 4, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006), availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/print/20060817-1.html.

68. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
69. See Bush, supra note 67 ("We must also prepare for the impact of the

20071

The PensionProtectionAct of 2006

PPA may provide further fuel for the migration away from defined
benefit plans. Moreover, it is entirely uncertain how financially
beleaguered corporations that sponsor defined benefit plans will be
able to comply with the new rules imposed by the PPA.
B. Some Major Provisionsof the PPA0
1.

New FundingRules for Defined Benefit Plans

Addressing the underfunding and default problems of defined
benefit plans, the PPA overhauled previous ERISA funding rules. 7
The new funding rules are based on the funding status of the
plan.72 Generally, these new funding rules are effective for the
2008 plan year.73 For single-employer defined benefit plans, the
PPA requires the plan to meet new minimum funding standards.74
The new funding target under the PPA is 100 percent, which
means that "the funding target of a plan for a plan year is the
present value of all benefits accrued or earned under the plan as of
the beginning of the plan year."75 A plan's required contribution
under the PPA equals the present value of benefits earned by
participants for the current year, plus any amount needed to
amortize funding shortfalls over a period of no longer than seven
years."6 This has the effect of requiring underfunded plans to
make "catch-up" payments in order to get those plans up to proper
funding levels. The Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
waive the minimum funding requirements for employers that are
unable to satisfy the minimum funding standard for the plan year
without "temporary substantial business hardship" if application
of the minimum funding standard would be "adverse to the
baby boomer generation's retirement, and what that impact will have on
federal entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare.").
70. The intent of this discussion is to highlight some of the major provisions
enacted by the PPA. It is certainly not an exhaustive discussion of all of the
extensive changes imposed by the PPA.
71. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 102, 112, 120
Stat. 780 (2006) (hereinafter PPA) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1083 and
establishing 26 U.S.C. § 430, respectfully); CCH, LEGISLATION 2006, PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 43 (2006).

72. Jenner & Block Client Alert, Pension Protection Act of 2006 (2006),
availableat http://www.jenner.com.
73. Id.
74. Single-employer plans are plans to which only one employer is required
to contribute. Id. In contrast, multiemployer plans are plans to which more
than one employer is required to contribute. 26 U.S.C. § 414(f)(1). As singleemployer plans comprise the majority of traditional defined benefit plans, this
article focuses on the provisions applicable to these plans.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(d)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 430(c)(4) (2000).
76. Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72. However, there is a phasein of the new 100% funding target. See 29 U.S.C. § 1083(c)(5); 26 U.S.C.
§ 430(c)(5).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:843

7
interests of plan participants in the aggregate."
Beginning in 2008, the PPA allows a plan sponsor to elect to78
maintain a credit balance, also known as a "pre-funding balance."
Similarly, plans formed prior to 2008 that maintain existing credit
balances may elect to maintain all or a portion of that balance as a
"funding standard carryover balance."79 Credit balances, whether
in the form of a "pre-funding balance" or a "funding standard
carryover balance," are available as a credit against the employer's
minimum funding contribution for the year in order to reduce the
amount the employer must pay for the year.' If a plan maintains
a pre-funding balance or a funding standard carryover balance,
the value of the plan's assets are reduced."1 Consequently, plan
sponsors may choose to reduce or waive any credits in order to
prevent the reduction of assets.82
As an incentive for employers to "add more money [to their
defined benefit plans] during good times and build up a cushion
that can keep pensions solvent in lean times,"' the PPA amended
the Code to provide increases in tax deductibility limits for defined
benefit plans. Beginning in 2008, the PPA will allow employers
that sponsor single-employer plans to contribute and deduct a
"cushion" equal to fifty percent of the funding target for the year,
plus amounts that reflect salary increase projections.8 Companies
will be able to use the money saved through tax deductions to
offset the increased money they forward to their defined benefit
plans. This will allow companies the possibility of beefing up
defined benefit plan funding without suffering a long-term
substantial shortage of available cash.

77. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(1)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(1)(A); CCH, supra note 71,
at 86. The Internal Revenue Service administers Title II of ERISA. Susan B.
Hutches, Web Resources for Employee Benefit and Corporate Research, in
UNDERSTANDING

ERISA

2006: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC

EMPLOYEE

RETIREMENT BENEFITS 191, 207 (2006). Title III of ERISA provides
jurisdictional, enforcement and administration rules administered by the
Department of Labor and Department of Treasury. Charles S. Crase &
Richard A. Bales, Why a Written Request for Plan Documents by an Attorney
Representing a Plan Participant or Beneficiary Should Trigger a Plan
Administrator'sDuty of Disclosure Under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(B)(4), 32
CAP. U. L. REv. 803, 808 (2004). Because the PPA operates in conjunction

with ERISA and the I.R.C., and ERISA and I.R.C. rules govern the
administration of the PPA, all of these agencies will have input into
interpretation and enforcement of the PPA.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(1)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(1)(A) (2000).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(1)(B); 26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(1)(B).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(2).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(4); 26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(4).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(5); 26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(5); CCH, supra note 71, at 100.
83. Bush, supra note 67.
84. See PPA § 801 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 404). Multiemployer plans are
entitled to deduct up to 140 percent of their current unfunded liability, minus
the value of the plan's assets. See PPA § 802 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 404).
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The PPA provides a new interest rate for calculating pension
liabilities. Under pre-PPA rules, plans use interest rates based on
the thirty-year Treasury bond interest rate. Industry leaders have
sharply criticized this rate claiming that it "artificially inflates
pension liabilities and funding obligations." 5 Therefore, in order
to ensure accurate calculations of the present value of plan
obligations, the new PPA provides for an interest rate using a
"corporate bond yield curve" based on a twenty-four-month
average on the top three grades of corporate bonds.86 There are
three different interest rate assumptions, depending on the
expected payment date of plan benefits: (1) zero to five years; (2)
five to twenty years; and (3) after twenty years.87 The PPA fully
phases in the new modified yield curve by 2010.'
In order to measure the value of plan assets, the PPA
establishes a valuation date, which is generally the first day of the
plan year.89 The value of plan assets is the fair market value of the
assets, but the PPA allows averaging. 90 The averaging period is
limited to two years, and plan asset values are required to be
between ninety and one-hundred percent of the fair market value
of the assets.9'
The PPA places even stricter funding rules on "at-risk"
plans.' At-risk plans are "subject to a higher funding target and
to a higher target normal cost" than other plans. 3
These
provisions aim to discourage and rectify underfunding by
accurately determining the present value of funding obligations,
and then requiring companies to fund accordingly. The funding
target for an at-risk plan is "the present value of all benefits
accrued or earned under the plan as of the beginning of the plan
year" as determined by using specified at-risk actuarial
assumptions.94 Similarly, the target normal cost of at-risk plans is
85. See, e.g., The Administration's Pension Reform Proposal, Committee on
Education and the Workforce, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (Testimony of Kenneth W.
Porter on Behalf of the American Benefits Council).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h)(12)(D)(i) and IRC); 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2); H.R. 4 Pension Protection Act of 2006, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee
Legislative Notice, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Jon Kyl, Chairman).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h)(1)(B); 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2); Jenner & Block Client
Alert, supra note 72.
88. H.R. 4 - PensionProtectionAct of 2006, supra note 86, at 4.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(g)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 430(g)(2). These provisions apply to
plans with fewer than 100 participants. A plan with 100 or fewer participants
may designate any day during the plan year as its valuation date. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(g)(3); 26 U.S.C. § 430(g)(3).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(g)(3); 26 U.S.C. § 430(g)(3).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(6) (discussing small plan exceptions to "at-risk"
plans). Only defined benefit plans with more than 500 employees for the plan
year can receive at-risk status. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(6).
93. CCH, supra note 71, at 111.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(1)(A)(i); 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(1)(A)(i).
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"the present value of all benefits which are expected to accrue or
be earned under the plan during the plan year."95
The PPA uses a "funding target attainment percentage,"
which is the "ratio of plan assets (reduced by credit balances) to
the funding target for the preceding plan year," in order to
determine the plan's financial health.' A plan is at-risk if: (1) "the
funding target attainment percentage for the preceding plan
year... is less than eighty percent," and (2) the funding target
attainment percentage for the preceding plan year including
specified at-risk actuarial assumptions97 is less than seventy
percent. 98 The eighty percent prong of the at-risk test will be
phased-in from 2008 to 2011.' The seventy percent prong of the
at-risk test is effective beginning 2008, but the applicable at-risk
actuarial assumptions will be phased in over a five-year period. 0°
In effect, these new rules make the liabilities of an at-risk plan
greater than they would be without the at-risk rules. 01 An
increase in plan liabilities means that companies will have to put
more money into the plan in order to meet its funding targets.
This provides incentive for companies to avoid underfunding, and
it also provides incentive for at-risk plans to rectify underfunding
as soon as possible.
Furthermore, the PPA imposes several new benefit
restrictions on underfunded plans. Benefit restrictions serve to

95. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(2)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(2)(A). Plans which are atrisk for the current plan year, as well as for at least two of the four preceding
plan years, are also subject to a "loading factor," which is incorporated into the
funding target and target normal cost. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(2)(B); 26 U.S.C.
§ 430(i)(2)(B).
96. H.R. 4 - Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 86, at 5; CCH,
supra note 71, at 109-10.
97. The actuarial assumptions are: (1) that all employees eligible to elect
benefits during the plan year and in the ten succeeding plan years will retire
at the earliest authorized retirement date (but not before the end of the plan
year for which the at-risk determination is being made); and (2) that all
employees will elect the retirement benefits available under the plan at the
assumed retirement age which would result in the highest present value of
benefits.

29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(1)(B) and IRC); 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(1)(B); CCH, supra note
71, at 110.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(4)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(4)(A); CCH, supra note 71,
at 109-10.
99. CCH, supra note 71, at 110. The funding target attainment percentage
for the first prong of the at-risk test is phased in as follows:
(1) in 2008, the percentage is sixty-five percent;
(2) in 2009, the percentage is seventy percent; and
(3) in 2010, the percentage is seventy-five percent.
29 U.S.C. § 1083(i)(4)(B); 26 U.S.C. § 430(i)(4)(B); CCH, supra note 71, at 110.
100. CCH, supra note 71, at 110; H.R. 4 - Pension Protection Act of 2006,
supra note 86, at 5.
101. See CCH, supra note 71, at 111.
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limit liability growth when a plan is underfunded.12 They also
prevent the "moral hazard" associated with underfunding,
reducing employer incentive to increase benefits instead of wages
during financially unstable times with the knowledge that the
PBGC will pick up the slack.'0" If a defined benefit plan is less
than sixty percent funded, then it is prohibited from paying
"unpredictable contingent event benefits."' 4 A defined benefit
plan that is less than eighty percent funded cannot adopt an
amendment "which has the effect of increasing liabilities of the
plan by reason of increases in benefits, establishment of new
benefits, changing the rate of benefit accrual, or changing the rate
The PPA also
at which benefits become nonforfeitable." 05
prohibits accelerated or lump-sum payments if the plan is under
sixty percent funded, or when the plan is in federal or state
bankruptcy proceedings."° A plan that is under sixty percent
funded must cease all benefit accruals until the plan sponsor
contributes enough to attain the sixty percent funding threshold. °7
Furthermore, plans cannot use credit balances to avoid these
underfunding restrictions.'°s
In order to provide relief to the financially- beleaguered
airline industry, the PPA adopts special funding rules for defined
benefit pension plans sponsored by commercial passenger
airlines."9 Airlines adopting a "hard freeze""0 on benefits receive
an additional ten years to meet funding obligations and an interest
rate of 8.85 percent to calculate pension contributions."' Those
102. United States Senate Special Comm'n on Aging, 109th Cong. 7 (2005)
(Testimony of Mark J. Warshawsky, Assistant Sec'y of Treasury).
103. Id.
104. See PPA § 103 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056); PPA § 113 (amending 26
U.S.C. § 436). An example of an unpredictable contingent event would be the
shutdown of an employer's operations. CCH, supra note 71, at 118.
105. PPA §§ 103, 113 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(2)(A); 26 U.S.C.
§ 436(c)(1)). However, an employer subject to these provisions is allowed to
amend an underfunded plan if the employer pays a contribution (in addition to
its minimum required contribution for the plan year) equal to the amount of
the increase in the funding target attributable to the amendment. See id.
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(2)(B) and U.S.C. § 436(c)(2)).
106. See id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(3) and U.S.C. § 436(d)); CCH,
supra note 71, at 120.
107. See id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(4) and U.S.C. § 486(e)).
Alternatively, an employer can provide sufficient security to the plan to enable
it to begin accruing benefits again. See id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(5)
and U.S.C. § 436(f)).
108. See id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g)(5)(B) and U.S.C. § 436(f)(2)).
109. See PPA § 402.
110. A "hard freeze" means that no participant in the plan will accrue
PENSION
further benefits based on job tenure or compensation growth.
BENEFIT GuAR. CORP., AN ANALYSIS OF FROZEN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
(2005), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/frozen-plans-1205.pdf.
111. H.R. 4 - Pension ProtectionAct of 2006, supra note 86, at 10.
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that do not adopt a "hard freeze"1 2are given three additional years
to meet their funding obligations.
One question that arises when analyzing these aggressive
new funding rules is how to ensure compliance from financially
troubled companies. While there are a variety of reasons why
companies underfund their pensions, some companies simply do
not have the financial resources to fully fund their plans. A
financially unstable company may not be able to satisfy these new
rules, especially since their minimum funding requirements will
increase once the rules are effective. Indeed, the PPA takes great
strides at preventing the pitfalls that lead to underfunding, but it
may be less effective at curing the current underfunding problem.
The above discussion merely highlights some of the major
funding changes imposed by the PPA. The funding changes
appear to be aimed at ensuring that plans are adequately funded
and avoid default. There have been criticisms, however, that the
new funding requirements will further push companies away from
defined benefit plans, especially those companies with healthy
plans, because the rules require most companies to contribute
more money to their plans per year. 3 Moreover, some critics
argue that the new rules are too volatile and do not add enough
stability, further pushing the drive toward defined contribution
plans."'
It is likely that it will take several years before the
accuracy of these predictions can be measured and to decide
whether the new funding rules are furthering the goal of
eradicating the problems of underfunded pensions.
2. Defined Benefit Plan Disclosure Statements
The PPA also requires sponsors of defined benefit plans to
provide periodic plan disclosure statements.
Sponsors must
provide the statements at least once every three years to each
participant in the plan, and sponsors must provide them at
1 5
anytime to a participant or beneficiary upon written request.
The statement must indicate, on the basis of the latest available
information, the participant's total accrued benefits and the total
vested percentage, or the earliest date on which benefits become
vested."6 The notice must be written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average plan participant, and it may be sent in

112. PPA § 402; H.R. 4 - Pension ProtectionAct of 2006, supra note 86, at 10.
113. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Pension Problems 101, CNN, May 17, 2005,
available
at
http://www.money.cnn.com/2005/05/17/retirement/pensionproblems/index.htm; Peter Baker, Bush Signs Sweeping Revision of Pension
Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at D01.
114. Sue Kirchoff, PensionAct: Does it Add to Instability?, U.S.A. TODAY, at
4B.
115. PPA § 508 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(1)(B)(i)).
116. Id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(2)(A)).
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written, electronic, or other appropriate form." 7 Alternatively, the
notice requirements can be met "if at least once each year the
administrator provides to the participant notice of the availability
of the pension benefit statement and 8the ways in which the
participant may obtain such statement.""
3. Protectionof the PBGC
The PPA has taken steps to combat the severely high-budget
deficit the PBGC is facing. Currently, plans covered by the PBGC
pay a flat-rate premium of thirty dollars per participant per
year."' Furthermore, underfunded plans must pay a variable rate
premium, which is based on the level of underfunding.
The
variable rate premium is nine dollars per one thousand dollars of
unfunded vested benefits at the end of the preceding plan year. 2 °
Beginning in 2008, the PPA will change the way underfunded plan
variable rate premiums are calculated. The determination of
unfunded vested benefits will conform to the funding rules of the
PPA discussed earlier."' The variable rate premium calculations
will be based on yield curve segment rates.'22 Significantly, the
PPA eliminates the "full funding limit" exception to variable rate
premiums."' Under that exception, no variable rate premium is
imposed if contributions made to the plan for the prior year were
at least equal to the full funding limit for that year.'24
The elimination of the full funding limit was intended to
combat the failure of the variable rate premium to raise sufficient
revenue for the PBGC."' Because less than twenty percent of
plans pay a variable rate premium due to the full funding limit
exception," 6 the elimination of the exception may result in large
increases of revenue for the PBGC. However, the changes in the
premium structure may push more companies away from
traditional pension plans. Many employers who were not subject
to premiums due to the full funding limit exception will see sharp
increases in their premium obligations once the exception is

117. Id.

118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i); CCH, supra note 71, at 202.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(ii); CCH, supra note 71, at 202.
121. CCH, supra note 71, at 203.
122. Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
123. PPA § 401 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E) to eliminate the
reference to 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(7), the full funding limit exception).
124. CCH, supra note 71, at 202. The full funding limit is not less than the
excess, if any, of ninety percent of the plan's liabilities over the actuarial value
of its assets. 26 U.S.C. § 412.
125. See United States Senate Budget Committee, 109th Cong. 28 (2005)
(Testimony of Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation); CCH, supra note 71, at 204.
126. CCH, supra note 71, at 204.
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eliminated in 2008.127 Furthermore, because the new variable
premium rates will be based on the new funding rules of the PPA,
employers whose funding requirements increase will also see a
rise in their PBGC premiums.12 Consequently, these changes may
not have the desired effect of significantly raising the PBGC's
annual revenues.
4. Executive Compensation
In a further effort to prevent pension default, the PPA
restricts
"the use of deferred
executive
compensation
arrangements for employers with severely underfunded plans."'29
The PPA prohibits employers from setting money aside to pay for
nonqualified deferred compensation for top executives if the
company is bankrupt, has an at-risk defined benefit plan or has a
terminated plan with insufficient assets to pay benefits.130 If
amounts are set aside in violation of this proscription, the
executive will be taxed and have to pay interest and a twenty
percent penalty.'
This provision takes effect as of the enactment
date of the PPA, but plans cannot be considered at-risk before the
2008 plan year.'3 2
5. Defined ContributionProvisions
The PPA imposes progressive new requirements intended to
strengthen and grow defined contribution plans. One of the most
significant changes provided by the PPA is the granting of
diversification rights to participants in "applicable defined
contribution plans. " " The diversification rights will allow eligible
participants to divest and reinvest those plan portions attributable
to employee contributions and elective deferrals invested in
publicly traded employer securities. '4 Regarding portions of an
individual's plan account attributable to employer contributions
(other than elective deferrals), which are invested in publicly
traded employer securities, the PPA allows participants who have
completed at least three years of service to divest and reinvest
127. Id. at 203.
128. Id.
129. House Committee on Education & the Workforce, Bill Summary, The
Pension ProtectionAct (H.R. 4), 109th Cong. (2006).
130. PPA § 116 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 409(A)).
131. Id.; Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
132. Id.
133. "Applicable defined contribution plan" means any defined contribution
plan holding publicly traded employer securities. PPA § 901 (amending 26
U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(E)(i)). Depending on how they are structured, employee
stock ownership plans (ESOP) may not be considered applicable defined
contribution plans. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(E)(ii).
134. PPA § 901 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1054 and 26 U.S.C. § 401); Jenner &
Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
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that portion.'
However, there is a phase-in approach for
diversification of the employer contribution portions invested in
employer securities acquired in any plan year prior to January 1,
2007.136
Diversification minimizes the risks associated with holding
too few and too risky investments.
Consequently, the PPA
requires plans that must allow diversification to offer at least
three investment alternatives other than employer securities.13
Diversified alternatives with materially different risk and return
characteristics are required.138 Plans may limit the time for
divestment
and
reinvestment
to
"periodic,
reasonable
opportunities occurring no less frequently than quarterly." 139 In
order to prevent employer discouragement of diversification,
employers cannot impose restrictions or conditions on investment
of employer securities that they do not impose on investments of
other assets of the plan, except as provided by application of
securities laws. 40
Recent major corporate scandals such as Enron highlight the
need for diversification in retirement planning.
While
investments in company stock are often a wise choice for
employees, placing too much emphasis in retirement planning on
employer securities creates the risk of catastrophe if the
employer's stock plummets in value. In order to encourage
diversification, the PPA requires plans to provide notice to
participants regarding their diversification rights."' The notice
must set forth the participants' rights to diversify their accounts
and describe "the importance of diversifying the investment of
retirement account assets."'
The notice must be "written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
participant and may be delivered in written, electronic, or other
appropriate form."" The notice requirements are effective as of
January 1, 2007.1"
In a major nod toward strengthening defined contribution
plan enrollment, the PPA allows for automatic enrollment of new
employees into employer sponsored 401(k) plans. 5
Allowing
135. Id. This also applies to beneficiaries of a participant or a deceased
participant.
136. Id.; CCH, supra note 71, at 225. The applicable percentages are 33% in
year one, 66% percent in year two, and 100% in year three and beyond.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(j)(4).
138. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(D)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(j)(4).
139. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(D)(ii)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(j)(4)(B)(i).
140. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(35)(D)(ii)(II); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(j)(4)(B)(ii).
141. PPA § 507 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1132).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See PPA § 902 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) and 29 U.S.C. § 1144).
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employers to automatically enroll employees in defined
contribution plans reflects the trend away from socialized
retirement programs in favor of private wealth providing for the
bulk of retirement security. The PPA outlines several safe harbor
requirements that employers who automatically enroll their
employees must fulfill, including default contribution rates, match
The PPA
rates, vesting, notice, and opt-out requirements.'4
law of a
"any
preempting
provisions
to
add
amends ERISA § 514
the
or
restrict
prohibit
indirectly
or
State which would directly
147
arrangement."
contribution
automatic
an
of
plan
any
in
inclusion
6. Hybrid/CashPlans
Hybrid plans are defined benefit plans that share
characteristics of both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans. A cash balance plan is a hybrid plan, and it is governed by
the same rules governing traditional defined benefit plans under
ERISA."''
Cash balance plans more closely resemble defined
contribution accounts because workers are provided with
In cash balance plans, however, the
individual accounts.1 49
employees' personal accounts are not separately funded.' Rather,
a participant is given a hypothetical account that receives a semiannual or annual credit comprised of a percentage of the
participant's compensation and an interest credit.'
Cash balance plans have been the source of major controversy
in recent years. These plans appeal to younger workers because
they are not back-loaded and therefore provide a more even benefit
to workers regardless of the time spent working for their
employer. 5 ' These types of plans are also more attractive to
employers because they are not as costly to maintain and the
funding obligations are not as volatile."' On the flipside, these
plans are disfavored by older, more experienced workers because it
is a move away from traditional plans which reward longevity and
experience. Unlike the traditional back-loaded pension plans, cash

146. Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72. The Department of Labor
recently issued a final regulation detailing conditions that must be satisfied in
order to obtain safe harbor relief. See Default Investment Alternatives Under
Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,452 (Oct. 24,
2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(e)(1).
148. Martin & Amert, supra note 26, at 455 (citing Employment Benefit
Research Institute, New EBRI Backgrounder Cash Balance Pros and Cons
Outlined, PR NEWSWIRE, June 24, 1999).
149. Id.
150. Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 637 (7th Cir.
2006).
151. Id.
152. Martin & Amert, supra note 26, at 455-56.
153. Id. at 458; CCH, supra note 71, at 334.
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balance plans are front-loaded, which means that benefits accrue
more rapidly during the early years of employment. 5 " Due to the
tension caused by these plans, litigation has ensued in which older
plaintiffs are claiming age discrimination. 5
One of the most significant actions taken by the PPA is the
legitimization of cash balance and hybrid pension plans. The PPA
clarifies that a defined benefit plan is not considered age
discriminatory "if a participant's accrued benefit, as determined as
of any date under the terms of the plan, would be equal to or
greater than that of any similarly situated, younger individual
who is or could be a participant."'56 A cash balance plan does not
violate the prohibition against ceasing or reducing the rate of an
employee's benefit accrual because of age' 7 as long as a
participant's accrued benefit meets the similarly situated standard
described above.'
Consequently, there is no discriminatory
violation being committed as long as similarly situated employees
receive equal annual credits to their accounts. However, it is
important to note that these age discrimination provisions are
prospective and that "[n]othing in the amendments.. . shall be
construed to create an inference" as to the legality of hybrid plans
in effect before the amendments. 9
The legalization of hybrid plans simply reflects the shift away
from traditional defined benefit plans.
Furthermore, these
provisions show the dichotomy and possible inconsistent objectives
of the PPA. The PPA attempts to ensure adequate funding is
present to meet the demands of defined benefit plan participants.
However, another theme emerging is that the PPA creates
incentives for employers to move away from offering traditional

154. Martin & Amert, supra note 26, at 459.
155. For instance, in Cooper, 457 F.3d at 638, the plaintiffs argued that
IBM's cash balance plan violated two anti-discrimination provisions in ERISA
because "younger employees receive interest credits for more years." The
Seventh Circuit upheld the legality of IBM's cash balance plan, finding that it
was not age discriminatory because the plan was age-neutral. Id. at 642.
According to Judge Easterbrook, in enacting the age discrimination provisions
in ERISA, Congress did not "set out to legislate against the fact that younger
workers have (statistically) more time left before retirement, and thus a
greater opportunity to earn interest on each year's retirement savings." Id. at
639.
156. PPA § 701 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1054, 26 U.S.C. § 411 and ADEA § 4);
Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72. "[A] participant is similarly
situated to any other such individual if such participant is identical to such
other individual in every respect (including period of service, compensation,
position, date of hire, work history, and any other respect) except for age."
Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H); 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(H).
158. PPA § 701(d) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 204, I.R.C. § 411 and ADEA § 4);
Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
159. PPA § 701 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1054, 26 U.S.C. § 411 and ADEA § 4).
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pensions. The clarification of the age discrimination rules and
their effect on hybrid plans is yet another example of Congress'
push to minimize the importance of traditional pensions in our
retirement system.
7.

Solving Tricky ERISA Provisions
ERISA has been criticized as one of the most confusing and
complex statutory schemes in existence.
One of ERISA's
"fundamental restrictions," the prohibition on transactions
between a plan and a "party in interest," has been scrutinized as
costly and burdensome." Section 406(a) of ERISA codifies a list of
several prohibited transactions
between a plan fiduciary and a
"party in interest." 6 ' In order to alleviate some of the burden
placed on plans to comply with the prohibited transactions statute,
the PPA creates several new prohibited transaction exceptions for:
(1) block trading; (2) transactions executed through approved
electronic communications networks, alternative trading systems,
or similar execution systems; (3) non-fiduciary service providers
who receive "adequate consideration"; (4) foreign exchange
securities transactions in which the broker does not have
investment discretion; and (5) cross trading between plans which
each have at least 100 million dollars in assets managed by the
same investment manager. 2 These exceptions have the dual
purpose of permitting plans "to complete many transactions more
freely, while still providing protection for plans and their
participants and beneficiaries. " "'
Another thorn in the side of plan administrators has been the
"plan assets" restriction imposed by the Department of Labor."
Under both the PPA and the Department of Labor regulation,
when a defined benefit plan invests in hedge funds, private equity
funds, or other similar investments, the underlying assets of those
funds may be considered "plan assets." 6' Fund managers attempt
to avoid plan assets because those assets subject the managers to
complicated ERISA rules, such as the fiduciary and prohibited
transaction rules.'66
The "significant benefit plan investor"
160. Alson R. Martin, Pension ProtectionAct of 2006, SM047 ALI-ABA 1, 43
(2006).
161. Parties in interest include employers, fiduciaries, participants, and
others. Harris Trust Sav. Bank v. Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238,
242 (2000).
162. PPA § 611 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1108 and 26 U.S.C. § 4975).
163. Andrew L. Oringer, Ancillary Provisions of the Pension Funding Bill
May Contribute to the Evolution of ERISA, BNA PENSION PROTECTION ACT
CENTER, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http'//www.subscript.bna.com/pic2/ppa.
nsf/ id/BNAP-6SSLZL?OpenDocument.
164. Id.
165. PPA § 611 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1001a; 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101)
166. Jenner & Block Client Alert, supra note 72.
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exception ameliorates this problem if immediately after the most
recent acquisition of any equity interest in the fund less than
twenty-five percent of each class of equity interests in the fund is
held by benefit plan investors. 7 Under the Department of Labor
regulation, "benefit plan investors" include any employee benefit
plan regardless of whether it is subject to ERISA.'
The PPA
revises the "benefit plan investors" definition to limit it to cover
only employee benefit plans that are subject to ERISA.6 9 This new
change will allow funds to foster and encourage investment from
ERISA plans while
providing more leeway in avoiding the plan
70
asset restrictions. 1
8.

The Future

Although the PPA aims to prevent defined benefit default, it
clearly reflects the nation's trend toward hybrid plans and defined
contribution plans. Defined contribution plans already provide
more security and less risk to employers, while being amenable to
today's mobile workforce.
By requiring diversification of
investment options in defined contribution plans, defined
contribution plans become even more attractive to employees.
Employers who want to gain a competitive advantage and retain
the best possible workforce may find that offering defined
contribution plans is the most feasible way to achieve that goal.
Consequently, a likely consequence of the PPA is that the erosion
of the defined benefit plan system will continue.
The enactment of the PPA is only the first step in the reform
of the nation's retirement system. The PPA is a highly technical
and dense act, and substantial guidance from Congress, the
Department of Labor, and the Internal Revenue Service will be
necessary in parsing all of the new rules. However, employers
now need to reassess their retirement plans in light of the new
PPA. Employers who provide defined benefit plans should review
their existing plans in order to ensure compliance with the new
funding rules. The increase in yearly funding obligations may
prove onerous for many employers, especially those who are in a
financially shaky position. Those employers who decide that
providing a defined benefit plan is no longer feasible or
competitively advantageous ought to consider changing the type of
retirement plan provided.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The retirement system in the United States is at a crossroads.
Government retirement plans such as Social Security are not
sufficient to guarantee enough retirement funds for the current
workforce. More than ever, employer sponsored retirement plans
are integral to proper retirement planning, and they will continue
to become more inportant in the future. The recent high-profile
collapse of several major defined benefit programs, as well as
major corporate scandals, have highlighted the need for changes to
the legislation governing employee benefit plans. The PPA
provides much needed reform to the law in an attempt to shore up
the current funding crisis.
Remarkably, there is a duality to the PPA. While it does take
steps to cure current defined benefit funding problems, it also
creates incentives for alternative retirement plans. It makes
defined contribution plans more attractive, and legalizes hybrid
plans. Furthermore, the new defined benefit funding rules may
prove onerous and costly, especially for those companies who need
to catch up on funding. This provides further cause for companies
to stop offering traditional defined benefit plans. In the end, the
PPA fosters different goals in that it opens new retirement funding
avenues and attempts to cure the problems that have arisen from
the defined benefit plan system, while at the same time attempts
to ensure the security of existing traditional defined benefit plans.

